Visual Attention: Bringing the Unseen Past into View  by Kentridge, Robert W.
Dispatch
R69partially due to the physical difficulty of
gripping and pulling the string through
the small hole, and so this question
deserves further study.
The results of the new study [6] add
to the growing call to ‘deconstruct’
animal insight into its component parts
[11–14]. Rather than simply presenting
naı¨ve animals with tricky tasks to see
howmany can pluck the solution ‘out of
thin air’, researchers have shifted their
focus to manipulating an individual’s
experience and examining how they
can generalise from what they have
seen or done before to new problems.
These studies [10–14] are not about
‘insight’ as such, but about how
animals represent the physical world
and the extent to which they can
mentally plan or simulate. Differences
in these abilities between species
may have important consequences
for how well they cope when
encountering new problems to be
solved, for example, when the
environment changes [15]. Taylor et al.
[6] point out that an ability to capitalise
on visual feedback concerning the
effect of one’s actionsmight be another
important ingredient for successful
problem-solving. The precise cognitive
mechanism by which that is achieved
will be an important question for future
study; operant conditioning is one
possibility, while another is causal
learning [16].
So is this, as Taylor et al. [6] suggest,
an end to insight? Neuroimaging work
supports the idea that human insightful
problem-solving is a qualitatively
distinct (and empirically tractable)
mental process, at least in the case of
verbal-reasoning problems [17]. When
people report having solved problems
like puzzle B in Figure 1 through insight
rather than through exhaustive search
strategies, distinctive patterns of brain
activation (for example, in the right
anterior superior temporal gyrus) point
toward inhibiting the processing of
closely-associated but unhelpful
information in the left hemisphere, and
unconscious activation of distant
connections in the right hemisphere,
when the solution suddenly ‘pops-
up’ [3].
Perhaps comparative psychologists
need to re-visit what a test of ‘insight’ is
trying to capture. In retrospect, the
spontaneous solution of the
string-pulling problem by naı¨ve birds
was always a puzzle: only a minority of
human participants solve insight
problems as it is, and how many couldsolve Maier’s two-string task without
prior experience with string or heavy
objects? An important part of Maier’s
challenge is to overcome the tendency
to view the objects as being fit for
a certain purpose. By capitalising on
this so-called ‘functional fixedness’,
Maier throws us red-herrings, ‘I could
stand on the chair’, we think, ‘or use the
spanner to extendmy reach’. Only once
we have supressed the obvious uses of
the objects do we have a chance of
solving the task. Maybe future studies
of animal insight could similarly adopt
the notion of functional fixedness. If an
object is routinely used in one context,
will it be harder for animals to use it in
a different way to solve a new problem?
Fittingly, if one message from the new
work is that the current paradigms are
better suited to more focussed study of
better-defined cognitive abilities (such
as the role of visual feedback in
problem solving), another is that for the
study of insight, comparative
researchers are going to need to think
outside the box.References
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Past into ViewAttention facilitates perception and can bring stimuli too faint to see into
consciousness. A new study shows that attention can reach into the past,
acting on the memory trace of a stimulus that has disappeared before being
attended.Robert W. Kentridge
Attention acts by facilitating the
processing of selected parts of the
world. Visually we might attend only to
stimuli that are on the left side of space.In experimental studies of attention,
a cue is typically used to tell observers
where to attend, such as a flashing spot
on one side of a display [1]. The effects
of attention vary with the delay
between presentation of the cue and of
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Attention takes time to act and so the
cue must typically be presented before
the targets to facilitate perception of
the target. For some types of cue,
attention acts for a limited duration and
its effects disappear, even reversing
into an impairment of perception, if the
delay between presentations of the cue
and targets is long. Our current
understanding is that attention must be
brought into action in advance of the
stimuli it is going to act on. Indeed,
when there is a question of whether
cues in a task are producing an effect
simply by virtue of their own sensory
properties rather than by directing
attention, a standard control involves
presenting the cues after the target in
order to measure their effects
independent of attention [2]. The study
reported in this issue ofCurrent Biology
by Sergent et al. [3] is the first to show
that a cue presented after a target can
produce a selective attentional effect
on the memory trace of the target. This
finding not only suggests that our
understanding of attention needs to be
revised, but also has implications for
theories about visual consciousness.
Sergent et al. [3] used a simple
design where attention was directed to
one of two spatial locations indicated
by circles on a computer display. One
of the circles briefly dimmed slightly,
indicating the attended location.
The target was a briefly presented,
low-contrast Gabor patch (essentially
a patch of fuzzy straight lines) at one of
the locations. The observer’s task was
to report the orientation of the Gabor
patch, choosing between one of two
alternatives presented at the end of
each trial. The location at which the
target had actually been presented
was indicated at the end of the trial so,
at the time the observer made their
judgement, there was no uncertainty
over the target location. That judgment
could, however, be influenced by the
effect of attention on processing visual
signals elicited at the time the target
was presented. The effect of cueing
was assessed by comparing the
accuracy of judgments between trials
where the target appeared at the cued
location with trials where it appeared
at the other location. This difference
was measured over a range of delays
between presentations of cues
and targets.
The results showed the cueing effect
increasing as the interval between cue
and target presentation decreasedfrom 400 ms to 100 ms (typical for
‘exogenously’ cued spatial attention).
Sergent et al. [3] also tested delays
where the cue followed the target; they
continued to find cueing effects when
the cue appeared up to 400 ms after
the target had disappeared from the
display. This extraordinary finding may
have beenmade possible by the type of
cues used. Typically, a highly salient
cue would be used to maximise the
capture of attention. Such salient cues
presented soon after a faint target
would, in addition to any attentional
effect, act as an effective mask,
interfering with perception of the
target. In Sergent et al.’s [3] task, the
cuewas aweak dimming of the circle at
the cued-location which would only
produce minimal masking.
Attending to a stimulus can increase
its salience. Attended stimuli appear to
have a higher contrast than physically
identical unattended stimuli. When the
contrast of a stimulus is just below the
threshold of visibility this increase in
salience can allow an observer to see
a stimulus that would otherwise be
invisible [4]. Sergent et al.’s [3] second
experiment examined the effect of
attention on the visibility of targets
at threshold. In addition to the
objective target orientation judgement,
observers also provided a subjective
rating of the target’s visibility. Signal
detection analyses show that attention
increased sensitivity to targets both
when cues preceded and followed the
targets. Estimates of the proportion
of consciously visible targets were
larger for attended than unattended
targets — retrospectively acting cues
appear to bring targets that would
have been unseen into consciousness.
These increases in subjective visibility
were accompanied by better
performance in the objective
orientation discrimination task.
Although the new study does not
directly address underlying
mechanisms, the effect must depend
on attention acting on some neural
trace that persists after the offset of
the target. We know that attention
modifies the neural response elicited
by targets [5] so it is, perhaps,
unsurprising that attention can affect
neural responses that continue after
target offset. Neural activity elicited
by transient visual stimuli persists for
long periods [6]. What is surprising is
that retro-active attention brings
otherwise unseen stimulus into
consciousness.Attention plays a role in many
theories of consciousness. Both
Lamme [7] and Dehaene et al. [8]
propose that attention can amplify the
neural trace of a stimulus so that it has
long-lasting effects spreading from
sensory areas of cortex to frontal
regions. They accommodate findings
that attention can act on stimuli
that do not elicit consciousness [9]
by suggesting that attention only
promotes stimuli to conscious
report whose sensory neuronal
representation persists through
feedback of signals between areas.
When attention produces a behavioural
effect in the absence of consciousness
the strength of neural response is
enhanced but no recurrent feedback
takes place. They differ in their views on
unattended stimuli that elicit recurrent
processing restricted to sensory areas:
Lamme [7] leaves open the possibility
that these too might produce
conscious experience, whereas
Dehaene et al. [8] refer to them as
‘preconscious’. The neural traces that
attention acts on in Sergent et al.’s [3]
experiments persist for so long that
they are likely to depend on feedback
of neural signals, so it appears that
without attention these recurrent
signals do not elicit consciousness, as
Dehaene et al. suggest.
The philosopher Ned Block [10],
however, distinguishes between two
forms of consciousness: phenomenal
consciousness, which corresponds to
the experience elicited by a stimulus,
and access consciousness, in which
the properties of the stimulus become
available to cognitive processes. Block
suggests that recurrent signalling that
remains restricted to posterior areas
generates phenomenal consciousness,
with access consciousness only
conferred on the posterior signal that
wins the competition to spread forward
frontally. He explains that ‘‘the strong
but still losing coalitions in the back of
the head are the neural basis of
phenomenal states (so long as they
involve recurrent activity)’’ ([10] p. 499).
Block’s [10] position originates
from consideration of a 1960 study
(reminiscent of that of Sergent et al. [3])
by George Sperling [11]. In the ‘partial
report’ experiment observers are
presented with a rectangular grid of
a dozen letters, arranged in three rows
of four, that is displayed for only 50 ms.
They must identify as many of the
letters as possible. The task is hard and
most observers only manage to report
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instructed to report as many letters as
possible from one particular row then,
even if the instruction is given just after
the letters were presented, observers
usually manage to report the complete
row of four letters. It seems that all of
the letters are potentially reportable,
but only four can actually be reported.
The cue instructs the observer which
four to select.
Block [10] emphasises that
observers have the impression they see
all of the letters even though they
cannot report all their identities. He
claims that the experience of the
unreported items is complete— it is not
a matter of seeing ‘blurs’ or generic
impressions of letters, but rather
seeing all of the letters in the array with
equal levels of phenomenal detail
despite only able to access the identity
of the reported subset. Items can exist
that are seen phenomenally but whose
identity cannot be reported because
the capacities of phenomenal and
access consciousness differ.
The contrary position, for example
[12], is that experience of the
unreported items is incomplete and so
there is no dissociation between
experience and cognitive access.For this to occur we need to have, in
Block’s own words ([13] p. 573),
‘‘unconscious representations that
are specific enough to do the task with
the observed accuracy. the cue is
supposed to promote attentional
amplification of the cued unconscious
specific representation, which, when
combined with the conscious generic
representation, results in a conscious
specific representation of the cued
item.’’ That is, of course, exactly what
Sergent et al. [3] have found (except
that their subjects do not even appear
to report a generic representation of
the unseen stimulus).
Sergent et al.’s [3] result does not
necessarily invalidate the distinction
between access and phenomenal
consciousness, but it does lend weight
to the alternative, and perhaps simpler,
position that consciousness is just
consciousness.References
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and Non-equilibriumThe spectacular adaptive radiation of cichlid fish in Lake Tanganyika
encompasses extensive morphological convergence and co-occurrence
of ecologically similar species, forcing a reevaluation of non-equilibrium
dynamics in community assembly.Rosemary G. Gillespie
The diversity of life is bewildering, but
two age-old questions remain: first, is
species origination dictated by chance
evolutionary events or constrained to
follow fairly predictable trajectories?
Second, does the observed diversity
and composition of species reflect an
equilibrium, and if so, over what time
period? In terms of species origin,
one argument is that evolutionary
outcomes are shaped by the whims
of immediate events: ‘‘The divine tape
player holds amillion scenarios. [and]
the end results are so different’’ [1].
The alternative is that outcomes areconstrained such that the appearance
of certain forms at a given time and
place becomes ‘‘very probable, if not
inevitable’’ [2]. With regards to
patterns of species composition, the
debate concerns the ‘balance of
nature’ — the idea that the overall
diversity at a site tends toward
a relatively steady state. This
supposition was questioned with the
recognition of the importance of
the dynamic nature of biodiversity,
and that patterns may be governed
more commonly by non-equilibrium
processes in which species diversity
is inherently unstable and changing
over time.Insights into these long-standing
questions, as often in evolutionary
biology, have come from insular
systems, habitats isolated by
surroundings that are inhospitable
to the respective organisms,
as these provide discrete settings,
often replicated over space and
time. Moreover, with the advent of
sophisticated genomic, isotopic,
and visualization tools, it has
become possible to understand the
detailed history of lineages, and the
extent to which patterns of
differentiation are linked to shifts in
ecology and associated morphology.
In a recent issue of Current Biology,
Muschick et al. [3] summarize
the results of an extraordinarily
comprehensive study of the
adaptive radiation of cichlid fish in
the African Great Lakes, in which
the ecological identity of species,
and their occurrence within a given
community, is frequently predictable.
The study represents the most
extensive quantitative analysis to date
